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timing attack. This paper is an extended paper for “A Secure 
TFTP Protocol with Security Proofs” [1]. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper is a continuation from our previous work in years 
2012 and 2014 [1]–[3]. The paper was written in a general 
information security terminology with a simple mathematical 
notation (semi-formal). It was intended for information security 
practitioner and not for mathematician or cryptographer as the 
main audience. We hope that this paper will give a worthy 
understanding of adversary model in Chosen-Ciphertext Attack 
with Timing Attack and its security proofs. We have considered 
this paper as a draft paper1. 
II. RESEARCH GOAL 
A. Objectives 
The purpose of this research work is to facilitate a timing-
attack in the random oracle model. We add the timing-attack in 
an Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attacks (CCA2) model.  
B. Motivations 
Referring to our previous work [3] [1], we have mentioned 
the need of a secure TFTP protocol particularly in various 
network administrative tasks such as monitoring and upgrading 
of remote embedded device’s firmware, where a lightweight 
protocol such as TFTP is usually employed. The security risks 
in such situations were also discussed with emphasis on 
concerns due to physical attacks wherein attackers access and 
modify Wi-Fi AP hardware and software[4]–[7]. In a preceding 
                                                          
1 Not complete and not being peer reviewers yet. Everyone is welcome to give 
any comment/suggestion for further improvements. 
work, we proposed an enhanced data communication package 
for DENX-UBOOT [8] firmware to include a secure TFTP 
protocol. However, our proposal did not suggest a specific 
cryptographic protocol for the successful implementation of the 
secure TFTP protocol [3]. In the effort to further augment the 
work, a proven secure and practical asymmetric cryptographic 
scheme, i.e. the Cramer-Shoup (CS) protocol is proposed to be 
deployed as the underlying cryptographic protocol [9] in the 
overall scheme. One may refer to [1]. 
III. RELATED WORK 
A. Chosen Plaintext Attack (CPA) 
Goldwasser-Micali (1982) [10] proposed a probabilistic 
encryption to replace a trapdoor-function for a better security  
evaluation in any encryption scheme. The authors argued that, 
trapdoor-function do not cover “the possibility of computing 𝑥 
from 𝑓(𝑥) when 𝑥 is of special form” and “the possibility of 
easily computing some partial information about 𝑥  from 
𝑓(𝑥)”[10]. The probabilistic encryption gives a better security 
property with equal to a probability of flipping a coin such that 
1
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 ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑎𝑛𝑑 
1
2
 𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙  in a fair game. An adversary win in a 
tossing coin game with probability of  
1
2
+  𝜀 ; where 𝜀  is an 
advantage that gives the adversary a better chance to win the 
game.  
Goldwasser-Micali proposed an adversary model that gives 
the adversary a knowledge of encryption protocol and its 
algorithm, but the adversary cannot obtain any information 
about a plaintext when given a ciphertext, except that a length 
of plaintext if an encryption scheme ratio was 𝑥: 𝑦  for 
𝑥 plaintext to 𝑦 ciphertext. The knowledge of plaintext’s length 
is easy to be obtained by the adversary because of the 
knowledge of the cryptographic protocol algorithm. To 
simulate the Goldwasser-Micali’s adversary model (CPA), we 
use indistinguishability test by let an adversary to choose two 
plaintexts (𝑚0, 𝑚1) 𝜀 ℳ where (𝑚0 ≠  𝑚1) and |𝑚0| = |𝑚1|. 
The plaintexts either (𝑚0, 𝑚1)  is randomly choose to be 
encrypted using encryption scheme Π = (𝒦, ℰ, 𝒟)  by a 
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(𝑝𝑘, 𝑠𝑘) ← 𝒦(1𝑘) 
𝑏 ← {0,1} 
𝑐∗ ∶= ℰ𝑝𝑘(𝑚𝑏) 
𝐿𝑒𝑡 𝑝(𝑛) 𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑛, 
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 𝑛. 
|𝑃𝑟[𝑠𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠] − 𝑃𝑟[𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒]| <  
1
𝑝(𝑛)
 
 
A ciphertext 𝑐∗  is given to the Adversary for a 
distinguishability test wherein the ciphertext 𝑐∗  is either 
encrypted of (𝑚0, 𝑚1) . The encryption scheme Π is 
semantically secure if any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) 
algorithms that are used in the adversary model to determine a 
correct plaintext from ciphertext 𝑐∗ with a negligible 
probability. Goldwasser-Micali (1984) [11] showed that the 
probabilistic encryption can be implemented under 
intractability assumption of  quadratic residuosity. 
B. Indistinguishability-Chosen Ciphertext Attack (IND-CCA1) 
IND-CCA1 is that give an adversary to access decryption 
function through a decryption oracle. The adversary can ask the 
oracle to decrypt any ciphertexts 𝑐𝑖𝜖 𝒞 except the one (e.g. 𝑐
∗) 
that being use for indistinguishability test. This adversary 
model gives the Adversary more knowledge than CPA’s model. 
However, the decryption oracle can be used by the adversary 
before the indistinguishability test is happen. Naor-Yung (1990) 
[12] was the leading that succeed in the IND-CCA1 to prove 
their public key cryptosystem is secure when the adversary is 
allow to access decryption oracle before execution of 
indistinguishability test. The scheme [12] use a non-interactive 
zero-knowledge (NIZK) with proofs that their protocol satisfied 
the completeness, soundness and zero-knowledge properties in 
PPT for a sufficient large 𝑛 in the 𝑝(𝑛). 
C. Indistinguishability-Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack 
(IND-CCA2) 
Rackoff-Simon (1991) [13] argued that an adversary in 
CCA1 may get an access to a decryption oracle even after the 
challenge’s ciphertext 𝑐∗ was issued. This attack is a practical 
security problem because it can be happen in a real-world. A 
security property for this kind of attack is that prevent the 
adversary from getting any useful information from other 
ciphertext 𝑐𝑖 that can helps to get a non-negligible advantage to 
distinguish the challenge’s ciphertext 𝑐∗ in a polynomial time. 
The authors [13] stressed that it is important to secure against 
this attack because a digital signature scheme (practical scheme 
in the real-world) that is vulnerable to this attack. The digital 
signature scheme is secure “if any such attacker succeeds in 
generating a valid signature for this last document with 
negligible probability” [13].  
IND-CCA2 model is that give an adversary to access 
decryption function through decryption oracle. The adversary 
can ask the oracle to decrypt any ciphertext 𝑐𝑖 except the one 
(ciphertext 𝑐∗ ) that being use for indistinguishability test. 
Referred to Figure 1, the IND-CCA2 allows the Adversary to 
get a decryption of ciphertext 𝑐𝑖  from the oracle in Phase 1 
(before) and Phase 2 (after) the challenge messages 
( 𝑚0, 𝑚1 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 |𝑚0| = |𝑚1| 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑚0 ≠ 𝑚1 ) are issued to 
Challenger. The Challenger will choose randomly either 
𝑚0 𝑜𝑟 𝑚1 to be encrypted. Ciphertext 𝑐
∗  is send to the 
Adversary. The Adversary need to distinguish the ciphertext 𝑐∗ 
is either 𝑚0 𝑜𝑟 𝑚1 with probability of  
1
2
+  𝜀. If the probability 
to guess a correct the ciphertext 𝑐∗ is greater than 
1
2
 with non-
negligible advantage in PPT; we conclude that the Adversary 
has an “advantage” and the given protocol Π is consider not 
secure in terms of indistinguishability. 
 
 
Figure 1: IND-CCA2’s Experiment 
 
IV. PROPOSED SECURITY MODEL 
We propose an attack model of Adaptive Chosen-Ciphertext 
Attack with Timing Attack (CCA2-TA) is that gives an 
adversary to access identical computing resources in term of 
computing power (e.g. CPU). The adversary is given the 
knowledge of time to perform cryptographic computations (e.g. 
primitive computation and protocol execution) in polynomial 
time. These were included that the adversary know the delay of 
network transmission for all transaction in the Phase 1, Phase 2 
and Challenge (refer to Figure 2).The adversary is also has the 
knowledge of CCA2. We defined the proposed security model 
in general terminology as below: 
 
Definition 1.0: An Adversary Model CCA2-TA allows an 
attacker to access runtime for cryptosystem  Π = (𝒦, ℰ, 𝒟) to 
perform ℰ ≝ encryption and 𝒟 ≝ 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 in a computing 
machine. The CCA2-TA has the corollary knowledge of CCA2’s 
Adversary Model in the computing machine. 
 
Definition 2.0: An Adversary Model CCA2-TA allows an 
attacker to access runtime for cryptosystem 𝛱 = (𝒦, ℰ, 𝒟) to 
perform ℰ ≝ encryption and 𝒟 ≝ 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  in a 
polynomial-time machine using random oracle model. The 
CCA2-TA has the corollary knowledge of CCA2’s Adversary 
Model for the polynomial-time machine. 
 
Theorem 1.0: The cryptosystem Π as defined in the Definition 
1.0 and 2.0 are secure from the CCA2-TA if the runtime to 
perform ℰ and  𝒟 are fixed-time 𝑡𝑓𝑡  for all valid inputs and for 
all invalid inputs into the function  ℰ and  𝒟 with an adversary 
advantage is negligible. The fixed-time 𝑡𝑓𝑡   of runtime for 
function ℰ to perform encryption and for function  𝒟 to perform 
decryption can be different 𝑡𝑓𝑡(ℰ) ≠  𝑡𝑓𝑡(𝒟). The rejected of 
invalid inputs is returned in fixed-time using that function’s 
runtime. 
 
Lemma 1.1: The cryptosystem 𝛱 as defined in the Definition 
2.0 is secure in Indistinguishability CCA2-TA experiment if a 
fixed-time of function ℰ is use in issuing a challenge ciphertext 
𝑐∗in PPT machine with an adversary advantage is negligible. 
The cryptosystem 𝛱  can use worse-cases 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒  for all valid 
inputs in function ℰ in polynomial-time machine as fixed-time 
for all execution of function ℰ .This including the rejected of 
invalid inputs is returned in fixed-time using that function’s 
runtime. The fixed-time using worse-cases time is secure for an 
implementation [14] but it makes the cryptosystem Π running in 
the most unfit condition. 
 
 
Figure 2: IND-CCA2-TA’s Experiment 
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